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Getting a Break from Forever: Chapter 828 Provides an
Opportunity for Juveniles Sentenced to Life Without Parole
to Get Their Lives Back
Roman Edwards
Code Section Affected
Penal Code § 1170 (amended).
SB 9 (Yee); 2012 STAT. Ch. 828.
I. INTRODUCTION
Christian Bracamontes is a thirty-one-year-old inmate at Lancaster State
1
Prison in California. He is serving a life sentence and will presumably die
2
behind bars. When he was sixteen years old, Bracamontes and his nineteen-year3
old friend, James, rode their bicycles down to a stream bed to paint graffiti.
While they were painting graffiti, another youth approached and offered to sell
4
them marijuana. After declining the offer, James asked Bracamontes if they
5
should rob the youth. Bracamontes replied that he did not care and followed
6
James over to the other youth. James pulled his gun out and the other youth
7
brazenly dared him to shoot. Bracamontes, who assumed both teenagers were
8
bluffing, turned away. As he picked up his bike, a shot rang out—a shot that
killed the youth who had offered to sell them marijuana, and a shot that would
ultimately lead to Bracamontes’ conviction and life sentence for aiding and
9
abetting murder.
There are over three-hundred inmates serving life sentences in California
10
prisons for crimes they committed as juveniles. A large body of research shows

1. Marisa Lagos, Bill Would Let Some Inmates Appeal Lifetime Terms, S.F. CHRON. (Aug. 7, 2011),
available at http://www.sfgate.com/default/article/Bill-would-let-some-inmates-appeal-lifetime-terms-2334960
.php (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
2. Id.
3. CHRISTINE BACK & ELIZABETH CALVIN, HUM. RTS. WATCH, WHEN I DIE, THEY’LL SEND ME HOME:
YOUTH SENTENCED TO LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE IN CALIFORNIA 23 (2008).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. CHRISTINE BACK & ELIZABETH CALVIN, HUM. RTS. WATCH, WHEN I DIE, THEY’LL SEND ME
HOME: YOUTH SENTENCED TO LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE IN CALIFORNIA, AN UPDATE 1 (2012). Forty-five
percent of these inmates, including an inmate who sat in the getaway car during a burglary and an inmate who
stood at a garage door as a lookout during a car theft, were convicted for aiding and abetting murders that they
did not actually commit. Id. at 4.
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the adolescent brain has comparatively reduced capacity to resist impulses and
11
social pressures, make sound judgments, and appreciate consequences. Chapter
828 provides an opportunity for release for those offenders who made tragically
12
poor decisions as juveniles, but have grown into responsible adults.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Under California law, the juvenile justice system processes most juvenile
13
offenders. However, offenders fourteen years of age or older charged with
murder or specified sex offenses are prosecuted in a court of general
14
jurisdiction. Additionally, juveniles accused of other offenses may also be tried
in a court of general jurisdiction based on a finding that they are not fit and
15
proper subjects for juvenile court treatment.
California law provides for punishment by either death or life imprisonment
16
without parole for certain murders committed under special circumstances.
Additionally, a murder committed by any accomplice during the commission of
specified felonies can result in a sentence of death or life without parole (LWOP)
17
for all accomplices.
In 2005, the United States Supreme Court held that it is unconstitutional to
execute an offender for a crime committed as a juvenile, notwithstanding that
capital punishment would be available for an adult offender who had committed
18
the same crime. This left LWOP as the default punishment for juveniles who
19
committed these specified capital offenses. Within the past decade, the United
States Supreme Court has trended towards further restricting the punishment of
juvenile offenders and, where state courts have chosen to try juvenile offenders
as adults, the Court has drawn a bright line between punishments for adult and
20
juvenile offenders. In 2010, the Court held that LWOP sentences for juveniles
11. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 9, at 10–11 (May 27,
2011).
12. Id.
13. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 602(a) (West 2008).
14. Id. § 602(b). This is often referred to as being charged as an adult. Id.
15. Id. § 707 (listing factors considered in this determination include the minor’s criminal sophistication
and prior criminal history, severity of the crime, and whether the court believes the minor can be rehabilitated
within the time the juvenile court has jurisdiction over the minor).
16. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a) (West 2008) (stating special circumstances include the use of
explosives, drive-by shootings, torture, and lying in wait; or against certain victims, such as police officers,
firefighters, judges, or prosecutors).
17. Id. § 190.2(a)(17) (listing specified felonies including burglary, robbery, rape, or arson).
18. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
19. See PENAL § 190.2 (requiring a punishment of either death or LWOP for first-degree murder under
special circumstances; if death is not permitted, then life without parole becomes the presumptive sentence for
those convicted of these crimes as juveniles).
20. See generally Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (holding the death penalty unconstitutional for offenses
committed by juveniles); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (holding LWOP sentences unconstitutional
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convicted of non-homicide offenses are unconstitutional. In 2012 the Court held
that mandatorily imposed LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders are
22
unconstitutional. California law, however, gives judges the discretion to
sentence a juvenile capital offender to a term of twenty-five years to life in lieu
23
of LWOP and is therefore compliant with the Supreme Court ruling.
III. CHAPTER 828
24

Chapter 828 amends California’s determinate sentencing law to allow
inmates serving LWOP sentences, for crimes committed when they were under
25
the age of eighteen, to have their sentences considered for reduction. Under the
amended law, an inmate who has served at least fifteen years of his life sentence
for a crime committed as a juvenile can petition the court for recall and
26
resentencing if he or she is able to demonstrate any one of a list of qualifying
27
28
conditions. The court, after considering several factors, may, in its discretion,
recall the LWOP sentence and resentence the inmate to a term of twenty-five-to29
life. Under Chapter 828, an inmate has three opportunities to petition the court:
30
after fifteen, twenty, and twenty-five years of incarceration. Finally, this
opportunity is unavailable to any inmate whose crimes included torture of a
31
victim or murder of a police officer or other public safety official.

for non-homicide offenses committed by juveniles); Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (holding
mandatory imposition of LWOP sentences unconstitutional for offenses committed by juveniles).
21. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2011.
22. Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455.
23. PENAL § 190.5.
24. Id. § 1170(a)(1) (West 2004) (“The Legislature . . . finds . . . that the elimination of disparity and the
provision of uniformity of sentences can best be achieved by determinate sentences fixed by statute in
proportion to the seriousness of the offense as determined by the Legislature to be imposed by the court with
specified discretion.”).
25. Id. § 1170 (amended by Chapter 828).
26. Id. § 1170(d)(2)(A)(i) (amended by Chapter 828).
27. Id. § 1170(d)(2)(B) (amended by Chapter 828) (qualifying conditions include that the inmate was
convicted of felony murder as an aider or abettor, that the inmate did not have any other juvenile adjudications
for violent crimes, that the inmate was with an adult codefendant when they committed the crime, or that the
inmate has demonstrated rehabilitation and remorse through education and vocational training while
incarcerated).
28. Id. § 1170(d)(2)(F) (amended by Chapter 828) (factors that the court may consider include, but are
not limited to, childhood trauma or stress experienced by the inmate, the inmate’s psychological or
developmental disabilities, the inmate’s maintenance of family ties while incarcerated, and the inmate’s
disciplinary history in prison).
29. See id. § 1170(d)(2)(G) (amended by Chapter 828) (permitting the court to “resentence the defendant
in the same manner as if the defendant had not previously been sentenced”); see also id. § 190.5(b) (West 2008)
(allowing the court to sentence an offender convicted of first degree murder under special circumstances as a
juvenile to a term of twenty-five-to-life as an alternative to LWOP).
30. Id. § 1170(d)(2)(H) (amended by Chapter 828).
31. Id. § 1170(d)(2)(A)(ii) (amended by Chapter 828).
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IV. ANALYSIS
Chapter 828 is based on accepted scientific principles of child psychology
32
and neurological development; it provides a narrowly-tailored pathway to
33
release for some juvenile offenders that is responsive to public safety concerns.
Chapter 828 also brings California law closer in line with international norms of
juvenile justice, and perhaps anticipates the trajectory of the United States
34
Supreme Court rulings in this area. However, in passing Chapter 828, the
legislature significantly limits the discretionary authority of prosecutors, judges,
35
and the governor.
A. The Developing Brain: Chapter 828 Applies Scientific Knowledge to a OneSize-Fits-All Sentencing Scheme
36

Senator Leland Yee, child psychologist and author of Chapter 828, has
stated that much of our juvenile sentencing law “ignores neuroscience and well37
accepted understandings of adolescent development . . . .” Researchers report
that significant changes in both hormone levels and brain development impact a
juvenile’s ability to control aggression and other impulses, and to make sound
38
judgments. Also, the development of areas of the brain that control cognitive
39
function continues into a person’s early twenties.
Although opponents of Chapter 828 have criticized these findings as “junk
40
science,” the United States Supreme Court has accepted similar findings,
writing in a 2010 decision:

32. See infra Part IV.A (discussing scientific studies that have found that juvenile hormone levels and
brain development impair decision-making ability).
33. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the restrictions and requirements placed on inmates seeking
resentencing under Chapter 828).
34. See infra Part IV.C (discussing international standards on juvenile sentences and the trajectory of
U.S. Supreme Court cases in this area).
35. See infra Part IV.D (discussing how the presence of charging and sentencing alternatives prior to
Chapter 828 ensured that those juveniles sentenced to LWOP were appropriately sentenced).
36. Interview with Adam Keigwin, Chief of Staff for Cal. Sen. Leland Yee, in Sacramento, Cal. (Aug. 1,
2012) [hereinafter Keigwin Interview] (notes on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
37. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, BILL ANALYSIS OF SB 9, at 10 (May 27, 2011).
38. ADAM ORTIZ, AM. BAR ASS’N JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR., “ADOLESCENT BRAIN DEVELOPMENT AND
LEGAL CULPABILITY” (2004), available at www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
39. Adam Ortiz, Juvenile Death Penalty: Is It Cruel and Unusual in Light of Contemporary Standards,
17 CRIM. JUST. 21, 23 (2003).
40. Juvenile Life Without Parole, NAT’L ORG. OF VICTIMS OF JUVENILE LIFERS, http://www.
teenkillers.org/index.php/ legislation/california-2/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
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[D]evelopments in psychology and brain science continue to show
fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds. For example,
parts of the brain involved in behavior control continue to mature
through late adolescence . . . . Juveniles are more capable of change than
are adults, and their actions are less likely to be evidence of
41
“irretrievably depraved character” than are the actions of adults.
If these findings are true, they suggest that younger offenders have a greater
capacity for rehabilitation and that determinate life sentence are inappropriate for
42
them.
B. A Modest Piece of Legislation: Chapter 828 Takes a Measured Approach to
Solving a Problem
A Los Angeles Times editorial described Chapter 828 as “astonishingly
43
modest.” Finally passing in its third reincarnation as a bill, Chapter 828 is a very
narrowly focused piece of legislation that hardly throws open the prison doors for
44
all violent offenders. The new law applies only to about three-hundred
45
inmates. Of those, it excludes the most serious offenders: those who tortured
46
their victims or murdered a law enforcement officer. For inmates who remain
eligible, Chapter 828 does not automatically provide a pathway to freedom, but
47
requires them to overcome significant obstacles. Resentencing is only available
to those offenders who can demonstrate their remorse and rehabilitation to the
48
sentencing court. Even so, resentencing is not guaranteed; it is entirely in the
49
discretion of the sentencing court whether to grant recall and resentencing. For
the few offenders who are successful in this endeavor, Chapter 828 does grant a
shorter sentence than others not sentenced to LWOP; they must serve no less
50
than twenty-five years behind bars before becoming eligible for parole.
Furthermore, eligibility for parole does not guarantee parole. Whether or not
parole is granted is a discretionary decision of the parole board, to whom the

41. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010).
42. See id. at 2029 (stating that an LWOP sentence requires a finding that the offender is incorrigible. If
the offender’s brain has not fully matured at the time of the offense, such a finding would not be possible.).
43. For Juvenile Lifers, A Chance, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/aug/21
/opinion/la-ed-sb9-20110821 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
44. Id.
45. See supra note 10 (stating that there are presently approximately three-hundred inmates in California
prisons serving LWOP sentences for crimes they committed as juveniles; these inmates—and any offenders
similarly sentenced in the future—are the only inmates to whom the new law applies).
46. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(d)(2)(A)(ii) (amended by Chapter 828).
47. Id. § 1170(d)(2)(A)–(J) (amended by Chapter 828).
48. Id. § 1170(d)(2) (amended by Chapter 828).
49. Id. § 190.5 (West 2008).
50. Id. § 3046(a)(2) (West 2011).
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51

offender must demonstrate that they are suitable for release. The parole board
52
does not grant parole to many inmates on their first attempt. Additionally, the
53
governor may veto the recommendation of the parole board. According to
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation statistics, the average
54
time served before parole for first-degree murder is over twenty-seven years.
Once paroled, parole agents supervise the offender for a period ranging from
55
seven years to life. During this period, the offender is subject to warrantless
searches by police, drug testing, and other conditions, the violation of which
56
could result in his or her return to incarceration.
Chapter 828’s authors concede that because juvenile offenders enter the
prison system at such a young and impressionable age, it is unlikely many will
develop the interpersonal and communication skills necessary to be successful in
57
the rigorous resentencing process. The psychological and behavioral impact of
spending so many formative years in a prison may make these offenders
unsuitable for release and at a high risk for recidivism, but the process is
58
designed to screen out these individuals. These safeguards prevent unsuitable
offenders from being released, without foreclosing the prospect of freedom for
59
the exceptional juvenile offender who has chosen the path of rehabilitation.
C. Supreme Court Rulings and International Standards: Is Chapter 828
Progressive Legislation?
The United States Supreme Court has placed restrictions on the punishment
of juvenile offenders, but states may offer greater protections than those
60
minimally set by the Court. Recent Supreme Court cases regarding the
punishment of juvenile offenders indicate that the trajectory of the Court is
61
towards limiting the punishment allowable for offenses committed by juveniles,
51. Id. § 3041.
52. CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., PAROLE SUITABILITY HEARING HANDBOOK 2 (rev. Dec. 2010),
available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Victim_Services/docs/BPHHandbook.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
53. PENAL § 3041.2.
54. CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB. DATA ANALYSIS UNIT, TIME SERVED ON PRISON SENTENCE 2
(2012), available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Branch/Annual
/TIME6/TIME6d2011.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
55. PENAL § 3000.1.
56. Id. § 3453.
57. Keigwin Interview, supra note 36.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 88.
61. See generally Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (holding mandatory imposition of LWOP
sentences unconstitutional for offenses committed by juveniles); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010)
(holding LWOP sentences unconstitutional for non-homicide offenses committed by juveniles); Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding the death penalty unconstitutional for offenses committed by
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perhaps even eliminating LWOP for juvenile offenders in the future. While
Chapter 828 does not go so far as to eliminate LWOP sentences for juvenile
offenders, it allows these sentences to be revisited and adjusted in cases where
63
appropriate.
The recent trend in the Supreme Court cases to limit juvenile punishments
began in 2005, when the Court held that application of the death penalty for
64
offenses committed by juveniles was unconstitutional. In that case, the Court
pointed out three major differences between adults and juveniles: juveniles have
a less-developed sense of responsibility that results in “ill-considered” decisions,
juveniles are more susceptible to peer pressure and negative influences, and the
65
personality traits of juveniles are transitory and not yet fixed. The result of these
differences, the Court noted, was that juvenile offenses were “not as
66
reprehensible as [those] of an adult.”
In 2010, the Court held that LWOP sentences for juveniles convicted of non67
homicide offenses are unconstitutional. The Court noted that “the sentence
alters the offender’s life by a forfeiture that is irrevocable” and “whatever the
future might hold in store for the mind and spirit of [the convict], he will remain
68
in prison for the rest of his days.” To justify LWOP sentences for a juvenile
“requires the sentencer to make a judgment that the juvenile is incorrigible. The
69
characteristics of juveniles make that judgment questionable.”
Continuing this trend, the Court most recently held in 2012 that mandatorily
70
imposed LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders are unconstitutional. The Court
noted that these sentences “preclude consideration of [the offender’s]
chronological age and its hallmark features . . . immaturity, impetuosity, and
71
failure to appreciate risks and consequences.”
While these cases fall short of declaring LWOP sentences for juveniles
unconstitutional per se, Justice Alito, in his Miller dissent, predicts that is exactly
where this line of cases may be headed:
The majority goes out of its way to express the view that the imposition
of a sentence of life without parole on a “child” (i.e., a murderer under
the age of 18) should be uncommon. Having held in Graham that a trial

juveniles).
62. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2489–90.
63. Keigwin Interview, supra note 36.
64. Roper, 543 U.S. 551.
65. Id. at 569–70.
66. Id.at 570.
67. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2011 (2010).
68. Id. at 2027.
69. Id. at 2029.
70. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
71. Id. at 2468.
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judge with discretionary sentencing authority may not impose a sentence
of life without parole on a minor who has committed a nonhomicide
offense, the Justices in the majority may soon extend that holding to
72
minors who commit murder. We will see.
Chapter 828 also brings California juvenile sentencing closer in line with
international norms. Presently, the United States is the only nation in the world
73
that has inmates serving LWOP sentences for crimes committed as juveniles.
The majority of the world’s nations have outlawed the practice and condemned it
74
through ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The United
75
States and Somalia are the only nations that have not ratified this treaty. In
addition to these two countries, ten other nations still have laws that allow
juvenile LWOP sentences, but do not currently have any inmates serving these
76
77
sentences. The United States, on the other hand, has nearly 2,500. The United
States Supreme Court has held that “[t]he climate of international opinion
78
concerning the acceptability of a particular punishment [is] not irrelevant,” and
has “looked beyond our Nation’s borders for support for its independent
79
conclusion that a particular punishment is cruel and unusual.”
D. Prosecutorial, Judicial, and Gubernatorial Discretion: Is Chapter 828
Really Necessary?
80

A major criticism of Chapter 828 is that it is unnecessary legislation
because there are already numerous safeguards to protect juveniles who deserve
81
leniency from LWOP sentences. First, prior to commencement of criminal
proceedings, juveniles enter into a hearing to determine whether they are fit to be
82
processed as a juvenile. Those juveniles who, because of their age, are not able

72. Id. at 2489–90.
73. Connie de la Vega & Michelle Leighton, Sentencing Our Children to Die in Prison: Global Law and
Practice, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 983, 985 (2008).
74. Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 37(a), Sept. 2, 1990, 1577 UNTS 3, 55–56.
75. UNITED NATIONS, SIGNATORY STATUS OF CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 3, available
at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-11&chapter=4&lang=en (last
visited Sept. 9, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
76. de la Vega & Leighton, supra note 73, at 990.
77. Id.
78. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796 (1982).
79. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2033 (2010).
80. Press Release, Office of the Dist. Attorney, Sacramento Cnty., Clemency Case Is Proof that
Legislation to End Life Sentences for Teen Killers Is Wrong (Jan. 4, 2011), available at http://www.sacda.
org/assets/pdf/pr/advisories/JLWOP.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
81. Letter from Jan Scully, Sacramento Cnty. Dist. Attorney, to Loni Hancock, Cal. Senator (Mar. 25,
2011), available at http://www.sacda.org/assets/pdf/pr/advisories/SCULLY SB 9 _3_.pdf (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
82. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707 (West 2008).
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to appreciate the severity of their actions, among other factors, should be
83
adjudicated under the juvenile system. Secondly, prosecutors have the
84
discretion not to pursue LWOP sentences. Because the death penalty is
unconstitutional for juvenile offenders, LWOP is the most severe sentence
available for juveniles; a lesser punishment is available where mitigating factors
85
exist. Thirdly, the sentencing judge has the discretion to sentence the offender to
86
a lesser sentence in cases where they feel LWOP is not appropriate.
87
Finally, the governor can grant pardons, such as in the recent case of Sara
88
Kruzan. Kruzan was a sixteen-year-old sex trafficking victim who murdered the
89
man who had been pimping her since she was thirteen years old. Kruzan was
90
convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to LWOP. In 2010, Governor
Schwarzenegger commuted Kruzan’s sentence to twenty-five-to-life, making her
91
eligible for parole in 2020. Prior to 2010, Kruzan had been the poster child of
92
Chapter 828’s predecessor bills.
V. CONCLUSION
Chapter 828 will probably only benefit a small percentage of inmates, those
whose crimes were so grave that they were given LWOP sentences, but whose
93
actions were more the result of adolescent delinquency rather than inherent evil.
While critics argue that other safeguards render the law redundant, the benefit it
bestows on these few individuals is one of profound importance: giving them
94
their life back, rather than forfeiting it to terminal incarceration. Chapter 828
provides a glimmer of hope and a source of motivation for young adults who
95
have thrown their lives away at a very young age. Chapter 828 also embraces
modern scientific knowledge, international consensus, and the trajectory of our
own nation’s Supreme Court, that adolescents lack the same culpability as adults

83. Id.
84. Letter from Jan Scully, supra note 81.
85. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.5(a) (West 2008).
86. Id.
87. CAL CONST. art. V, § 8 (West 1996).
88. Amita Sharma, AG Reverses Decision on Woman Who Killed Her Pimp, KBPS (Apr. 17, 2012),
http://www.kpbs.org/news/2012/apr/17/ag-reverses-decision-woman-who-killed-her-pimp/ (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Keigwin Interview, supra note 36.
93. Id.
94. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027 (2010) (discussing the harshness of a LWOP sentence
on a juvenile offender).
95. Keigwin Interview, supra note 36.
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and should not be subject to penalties that foreclose any opportunity of
96
redemption.

96. See supra Part IV (discussing the scientific basis of Chapter 828, recent Supreme Court cases
regarding juvenile sentencing, and international norms in juvenile sentencing).
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